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1 Introduction
This paper studies the optimal pay-as-you-go social security in a Diamond (1965)-type overlapping-generations
model with endogenous retirement and the depreciation of an agent’s labor productivity. It is known that in
a standard Diamond-type overlapping-generations model, the optimal allocation or the golden rule is achieved
in the decentralized economy by using pay-as-you-go social security.1 In this standard model, an agent will
retire once s/he becomes old. This paper loosens this assumption by adding an old agent’s decision making
on retirement age. This is a natural extension because several empirical works have shown that social security
benefits affect an individual’s decision making on retirement (see, for instance, Gruber and Wise (1999) and
Fenge and Pestieau (2007)).
Michel and Pestieau (2013) consider a similar environment to this paper’s and investigate the first-best allo-
cation and the second-best allocation. The first-best allocation is an allocation that maximizes welfare subject
to the resource constraint and an old agent’s time constraint.2 In other words, a social planner can distribute
resources and force an old agent to work and retire as she wants. In contrast, the social planner can redistribute
resources across generations through taxation but cannot force an old agent to work or retire as she wants in a
decentralized economy. The second-best allocation is an (equilibrium) allocation that maximizes welfare in the
decentralized economy.3 The comparison between these two social optima is meaningful because in the real
world, the redistribution of resources is feasible through taxation, whereas no one can force others to work or
retire because of civil liberties and other factors. Michel and Pestieau (2013) show that the first-best allocation
cannot be achieved in the decentralized economy.
This paper imposes the assumption that labor productivity depreciates over age in the model in Michel and
Pestieau (2013). This is a natural assumption.4 Under this setting, this paper finds the range of an old agent’s
labor productivity in which the first-best allocation is achieved in the decentralized economy. As in Michel and
Pestieau (2013), this paper considers an additively separable natural log utility function and a Cobb-Douglas
production function because of the tractability of the model.5
Why can the first-best allocation be achieved in the decentralized economy when the depreciation of labor
productivity is taken into account? Consider the case in which an old agent’s labor producitivty is low (relative
1Optimality is defined by using an agent’s lifetime utility in the steady state. For the formal definition, see Section 4.
2Welfare is defined by an agent’s lifetime utility in the steady state. The formal definition is given in Section 4.
3An equilibrium concept in this paper is a standard perfect foresight competitive equilibrium.
4For instance, Figure 2 in Kitao (2014) shows that labor productivity reaches its peak at age 50 and starts to decrease over age.
5Michel and Pestieau (2013) argue that “. . . the reason for the omission [of the study of the interaction between social security and
retirement] [is] in the analytical difficulty of studying the dynamics of overlapping-generations models with endogenous labor supply.”
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to a young agent’s labor productivity) and the capital share in the production function is also low. Since an
old agent’s labor productivity is low, an old agent fully retires in the first-best allocation. Moreover, capital
accumulation is set to satisfy the golden rule, which is f ′(k) = 1, in the first-best allocation.6 Consider the
decentralized economy with a zero payroll tax rate, which is called a laissez-faire economy. When the capital
share is low enough, capital is over-accumulated in equilibrium; that is, r= f ′(k)< 1, where r is the interest rate,
and an old agent works in equilibrium because of the low return from savings. As the payroll tax rate increases,
the labor supplied by an old agent decreases and savings by a young agent decreases. How capital per unit of
effective labor, k, changes is ambiguous in general, but under this paper’s setting, k is constant as long as an
old agent’s labor supply is positive. Once an old agent fully retires, k starts to decrease as the payroll tax rate
increases. Since an old agent fully retires in the first-best allocation and the labor supply is bounded below by 0,
the social planner will set a sufficiently high payroll tax rate that an old agent fully retires and the golden rule is
achieved in the decentralized economy. Thus, the first-best allocation is achieved in the decentralized economy.
This argument does not hold once an old agent partially retires in the first-best allocation. A sufficiently high
payroll tax rate can achieve the golden rule, whereas an old agent works less than the first-best level. In contrast,
a low tax rate can achieve the first-best level of an old agent’s labor supply, while capital is over-accumulated.
Therefore, the first-best allocation is not achieved in the decentralized economy, as Michel and Pestieau (2013)
suggest.
Another finding that differs from Michel and Pestieau (2013) is that the second-best payroll tax rate can
achieve the golden rule level of capital with an under-supply of an old agent’s labor. In Michel and Pestieau
(2013), the second-best payroll tax rate is lower than the rate at which the golden rule is achieved. In other
words, when labor productivity does not depreciate at all, the labor supply by an old agent is at the first-best level
and capital is over-accumulated in the second-best allocation. This paper presents a case in which capital per
unit of effective labor is at the first-best level and the labor supplied by an old agent is lower than the first-best
level in the second-best allocation.
Before Michel and Pestieau (2013), a theoretical analysis in a dynamic general equilibrium setting was per-
formed by Hu (1979). He analyzes the effects of pay-as-you-go social security on an old agent’s retirement
decision making, equilibrium, and welfare in a more general two-period overlapping-generations setting. Under
this setting, he shows that more generous social security benefits make an old agent retire earlier, which is con-
sistent with the empirical findings of Gruber and Wise (1999). An old agent’s retirement decision making has
6k represents capital per unit of effective labor. Formally, k = Amount of savingsEffective labor . Moreover, the population growth rate is set at 1
here.
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been analyzed in various frameworks. For example, Aı´sa et al. (2012) focus on the effects of life expectancy on
the labor supply of the elderly, while Mizuno and Yakita (2013) focus on fertility decisions. Some papers inves-
tigate how exogenously determined retirement age affects the economy. For instance, Sala-i-Martin (1996) and
Miyazaki (2014) show the possibility that early retirement induced by pay-as-you-go social security increases
aggregate output. In this sense, pay-as-you-go social security is a mechanism that stimulates economic growth
by having less productive old people retire early. This paper considers endogenous retirement instead of exoge-
nous retirement and shows that pay-as-you-go social security is a mechanism that improves welfare by having
less productive old people retire early in some cases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model in full, and Section 3
analyzes the equilibrium. Sections 4 analyzes welfare, and Section 5 discusses the findings in this paper. Section
6 concludes.
2 Model
Time is discrete and continues forever, t = 1,2, . . . .
2.1 Agent
An agent lives for two periods: young and old. A young agent is endowed with one unit of time, and supplies
labor inelastically. After production occurs, a young agent receives labor income, wt . A young agent also has to
pay the payroll tax, which is denoted by τ ∈ [0,1). With disposable income, (1− τ)wt , a young agent decides
how much to consume, cyt , and how much to save, st . Thus, a young agent’s budget constraint is
cyt + st = (1− τ)wt . (1)
A young agent’s saving at date t, st , is used for production at t+1 as a capital good without any transformation
cost from one unit of a consumption good to a capital good. A young agent at date t saves st and becomes old at
t+1, when s/he receives the interest income, rt+1st , where rt+1 is the interest rate. An old agent is also endowed
with one unit of time. If s/he works for 1− lot+1 unit of time, s/he receives labor income, (1− lot+1)θwt+1, where
θ ∈ (0,1] is an old agent’s labor productivity relative to that of a young agent. In addition, s/he has to pay the
payroll tax, and thus his/her disposable labor income is (1− τ)(1− lot+1)θwt+1.7 Once an old agent retires, s/he
7The tax rate can depend on age and labor income, and such a tax scheme is richer than this paper’s. As will be shown in the following
section, however, the current tax scheme is sufficient to show that the first-best allocation can be achieved in a decentralized economy.
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is eligible to receive the social security benefit, lot+1Pt+1. Thus, an old agent’s retirement age is 2− lot+1. An old
agent’s budget constraint in period t+1 is
cot+1 = rt+1st +(1− τ)(1− lot+1)θwt+1+ lot+1Pt+1. (2)
From Equations (1) and (2), an agent’s lifetime budget constraint is
cyt +
cot+1
rt+1
= (1− τ)wt +
(1− τ)(1− lot+1)θwt+1+ lot+1Pt+1
rt+1
. (3)
An agent’s lifetime utility is represented by the following function:
U(cyt ,c
o
t+1, l
o
t+1) := ln(c
y
t )+β ln(cot+1)+ γ ln(l
o
t+1),
where β ∈ (0,1] and γ ∈ (0,1] are the weights on the preference over consumption when old and leisure when
old, respectively, relative to consumption when young. Hence, an agent’s problem is
maxcyt ,cot+1,lot+1 U(c
y
t ,c
o
t+1, l
o
t+1)
s.t. Equation (3)
0≤ lot+1 ≤ 1. (4)
The last constraint is a time constraint for an old agent. Note that since the utility from leisure is represented
by γ ln(lot+1), in the solution to the maximization problem, lot+1 > 0 must hold. Therefore, Equation (4) can be
replaced by lot+1 ≤ 1.
An initially old agent has saved s0 > 0 at date 0. It is assumed that the population is constant forever and is
normalized to one.8
2.2 Firm
At each date, the representative firm produces a single unit of output using labor and capital. Let Lt and Kt be
the aggregate effective labor and aggregate capital, respectively. A production function is F(K,L) = KαL1−α ,
where α ∈ (0,1). I assume that factor markets are perfectly competitive and that capital is assumed to be fully
8This assumption is not qualitatively or quantitatively harmful for the following results as long as the growth rate is given exogenously.
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depreciated once production occurs. Thus, a profit-maximizing firm’s problem is
max
Kt ,Lt
{F(Kt ,Lt)−wtLt − rtKt}
for all t, where rt is the rental rate of capital. Let kt be capital per unit of effective labor at date t, that is,
kt := Kt/Lt . Let f (k) := kα . Then, from the firm’s problem,
rt = f ′(kt) = αkα−1t (5)
and
wt = f (kt)− kt f ′(kt) = (1−α)kαt . (6)
2.3 Government
The government in every period balances the pay-as-you-go social security budget according to the following
formula: for all t ≥ 0,
lot+1Pt+1 = τwt+1[1+θ(1− lot+1)]. (7)
This equation implicitly ignores the case of lot+1 = 0. Since an old agent does not choose lot+1 = 0 in equilibrium,
the government budget constraint is well defined.
2.4 Equilibrium and the steady state
An equilibrium concept is a standard perfect foresight competitive equilibrium. The formal definition is given
below.
Definition 1. Given the initial capital stock, K1 = s0, the payroll tax rate, τ ∈ [0,1), and the productivity of an
old agent, θ ∈ (0,1], an equilibrium consists of a sequence of an agent’s consumption when young and when
old, savings, and leisure when old, (co1, lo1 ,(c
y
t ,st ,cot+1, l
o
t+1)
∞
t=1); a sequence of prices, (rt ,wt)∞t=1; a sequence of
factors of production, (Kt ,Lt)∞t=1; and a sequence of social security benefits, (Pt)∞t=1; such that:
1. Given the payroll tax rate, prices and social security benefits, (cyt ,st ,cot+1, lot+1) solves a young agent’s
problem for all t ≥ 1.
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2. The initially old agent solves
maxco1,lo1 β ln(c
o
1)+ γ ln(l
o
1)
s.t. co1 = (1− τ)(1− lo1)θw1+ l1P1+ r1s0, 0≤ lo1 ≤ 1.
3. The factor prices are determined by Equations (5) and (6).
4. A capital market and a labor market clear, that is, Kt = st−1 and Lt = 1+θ(1− lot ).
5. The government budget constraint is satisfied, that is, (7) holds.
A combination of time-invariant variables is called a steady state.
3 Equilibrium analysis
In this section, an equilibrium is characterized.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the payroll tax rate satisfies
τ ≥ τ̂ := β (1−α)θ − γα
(1−α)[β (1+θ)+ γ] . (8)
Then, in equilibrium, an old agent fully retires, lot+1 = 1 for all t, and the equilibrium economic growth is char-
acterized by
kt+1 =
αβ (1− τ)(1−α)
(1+β )α+ τ(1−α)k
α
t .
Furthermore, there exists a unique non-zero steady state, k f (τ), where
k f (τ) :=
[
αβ (1− τ)(1−α)
(1+β )α+ τ(1−α)
] 1
1−α
, (9)
and it is globally stable.9
Proof. See the Appendix.
9In the following, the subscript “ f ” indicates “full retirement.”
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If Equation (8) is satisfied, then an old agent will retire fully in equilibrium. The first implication is that if
the payroll tax rate is too high, since an old agent loses the incentive to work, s/he will retire fully. However,
Equation (8) holds even if τ is low.
If β (1−α)θ ≤ γα or α ≥ βθβθ+γ holds, then the RHS of Equation (8) is less than or equal to zero. This
implies that for any τ ∈ [0,1), an old agent fully retires in equilibrium. One case in which β (1−α)θ < γα
holds is where γ is sufficiently large. That is, for an agent, leisure in the second period is more valuable relative
to consumption when young and when old. Therefore, even though the payroll tax rate is low enough, an old
agent will retire fully. Another case is where α is large. Since 1−α represents the labor share, if α is large, then
the return from labor is low. Thus, an old agent will lose the incentive to work. One more case is where θ is
sufficiently small. Since θ is an old agent’s productivity relative to a young agent’s productivity, the return from
work for an old agent is sufficiently low. Therefore, an old agent will retire fully.
Let
g f (τ) :=
αβ (1− τ)(1−α)
(1+β )α+ τ(1−α) .
Thus, kt+1 = g f (τ)kαt (Equation (17)). It is clear that
∂g f
∂τ < 0. Therefore, the following result holds.
Proposition 2. Suppose that τ ≥ τ̂. Then, a slight increase in τ decreases the law of motion of capital per unit
of effective labor.
As long as τ satisfies Equation (8), all agents will retire when they become old. This situation is the same as
the standard overlapping-generations model with production in Diamond (1965). Therefore, a higher τ reduces
the amount of savings, which leads the law of motion of capital per unit of effective labor to rotate downward.
From this result, the following result regarding the steady state is derived.
Corollary 1. Suppose that τ ≥ τ̂. Then, a slight increase in τ depresses the steady state capital per unit of
effective labor.
The next proposition considers the case in which τ is less than τ̂ .
Proposition 3. Suppose that the payroll tax rate satisfies 0≤ τ < τ̂ . Then, in equilibrium, an old agent in period
t+1 works for 1− lot+1, where
lot+1 =
γ(1− τ)(α+θ)+ τ(1+θ)[β (1−α)+ γ]
θ [β (1−α)+ γ] < 1, (10)
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and the equilibrium economic growth is characterized by
kt+1 =
α[β (1−α)+ γ]
α(1+β + γ)+θ(1+αβ )
kαt . (11)
Moreover, there is a unique non-zero steady state, kp(τ), where
kp(τ) :=
[
α[β (1−α)+ γ]
α(1+β + γ)+θ(1+αβ )
] 1
1−α
, (12)
and it is globally stable.10
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that for 0< τ ≤ τ̂ to be true, α needs to satisfy
α < α :=
βθ
βθ + γ
.
This fact proves the following result.
Proposition 4. Suppose that 0≤ τ < τ̂ . Then, a slight increase in τ increases lot+1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
If τ increases, when an old agent works, s/he has to pay more tax. This decreases the old agent’s incentive
to work. Therefore, working time, 1− lot+1, decreases as τ increases.
Let
gp(τ) =:
α[β (1−α)+ γ]
α(1+β + γ)+θ(1+αβ )
.
Then, Equation (11) is written as kt+1 = gp(τ)kαt . It is clear that a change in τ does not affect the law of motion
of capital per unit of effective labor. Hence, a change in τ does not affect the output per unit of effective labor.
From Proposition 4, if τ increases, then an old agent works less. Since Equation (11) does not change in τ , an
increase in τ also decreases the amount of savings. In general, this could affect economic growth through capital
formation. Since an old agent supplies less labor than before, however, the capital stock per unit of effective
labor is not affected at all.
Corollary 2. Suppose that 0≤ τ < τ̂ . Then, τ does not change the steady state at all.
10In the following, the subscript “p” indicates “partial retirement.”
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The output per unit of effective labor is not affected by a change in τ . Aggregate output, however, will
decrease as τ increases. This is because even though the capital stock per unit of effective labor does not change,
the aggregate labor supplied by an old agent will decrease as τ increases.
4 Welfare
This section discusses welfare. Following the previous literature (e.g., Michel and Pestieau (2013)), welfare is
defined by an agent’s lifetime utility in the steady state.
4.1 First-best allocation
First, as a benchmark, I characterize the first-best allocation in the model. To define the first-best allocation, first,
I define the feasible allocation. A steady-state allocation, (cy,co, lo,k), is feasible if (cy,co, lo,k) ∈ R4+ satisfies
the resource constraint and the time constraint, that is,
cy+ co = [1+θ(1− lo)][ f (k)− k] and lo ∈ [0,1].
The first-best allocation is a feasible allocation that maximizes
ln(cy)+β ln(co)+ γ ln(lo).
Let
θ̂ :=
γ
1+β
.
A high θ̂ implies that leisure is more valuable than lifetime consumption. If an old agent’s labor productivity is
higher than θ̂ , that is, θ(1+β )> γ , then an old agent should work more and agents should consume more at the
first-best allocation.
Proposition 5. If θ > θ̂ , the first-best allocation is
cy∗ =
(1+θ)(1−α)
1+β + γ
α
α
1−α ,co∗ = βcy∗, lo∗ =
γ(1+θ)
θ(1+β + γ)
< 1,k∗ = α
1
1−α .
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If θ ≤ θ̂ , the first-best allocation is
cy∗ =
1−α
1+β
α
α
1−α ,co∗ = βcy∗, lo∗ = 1,k∗ = α
1
1−α .
Proof. See the Appendix.
In general, these first-best allocations cannot be achieved in the decentralized economy without any interven-
tion. Moreover, if the social planner redistributes resources across across generations and controls the retirement
age, then the first-best allocation can be achieved in the decentralized economy. Inter-generational redistribu-
tion is feasible through taxation, whereas retirement age control is quite difficult to implement in the real world.
Thus, in the next section, I consider an environment in which only pay-as-you-go social security is feasible for
the social planner to redistribute outputs across generations, and I characterize the second-best allocation in the
decentralized economy. Michel and Pestieau (2013) investigate the same question and conclude that the first-best
allocation is not achieved if pay-as-you-go social security is the only available policy for the social planner. The
following section, however, shows that their result relies on their implicit assumption that labor productivity does
not depreciate over age.
4.2 Second-best allocation
Let W (τ) denote an agent’s lifetime utility in the steady state given τ . Formally,
W (τ) := ln(cy)+β ln(co)+ γ ln(lo),
where (cy,co, lo) is a steady-state allocation to which an equilibrium allocation, (cyt ,cot+1, lot+1)∞t=1, converges
given τ . Thus, the social planner’s second-best problem is to maximize W (τ) by choosing τ ∈ [0,1).
Proposition 6.
1. Suppose that θ ≤ θ̂ . Then,
(i) For α ≥ α˜ := β1+2β , the second-best payroll tax rate is 0, an old agent fully retires, and capital is
under-accumulated.
(ii) For α < α˜ , the second-best payroll tax rate is τ˜ f ∈ (0,1), an old agent fully retires, and capital is
the golden rule, where τ˜ f maximizes W (τ) conditional on an old agent fully retiring.
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2. Suppose that β + γ ≥ θ > θ̂ . Then,
(i) For α ≥ α = βθβθ+γ , the second-best tax rate is 0, an old agent fully retires, and capital is under-
accumulated.
(ii) Forα >α ≥ α̂ := β+γ−θ1+γ+β (2+θ) , the second-best tax rate is 0, an old agent partially retires, and capital
is under-accumulated.
(iii) For α < α̂ , the second-best payroll tax rate is argmax{W (τ˜p),W (τ˜ f )}, and an old agent fully retires
and capital is the golden rule when the second-best payroll tax rate is τ˜ f , whole an old agent par-
tially retires and capital is over-accumulated when the second-best payroll tax rate is τ˜p, where τ˜p
maximizes W (τ) conditional on an old agent partially retiring.
3. If θ > β + γ , 2(i) and 2(ii) hold.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Recall that when θ ≤ θ̂ , since an old agent’s labor productivity is low, in the first-best allocation, an old
agent fully retires. When α is high, the labor share is low. In addition, the interest rate is high, that is, r > 1, in
a laissez-faire equilibrium.11 Because of these facts and an old agent’s low labor productivity, an old agent fully
retires in a laissez-faire equilibrium. Since lo ≤ 1 and lo increases as τ increases, an old agent fully retires in
equilibrium for all τ ∈ [0,1). Because when capital is under-accumulated, transfer from a young agent to an old
agent lowers welfare, τ = 0 is the second-best payroll tax rate. When α is low enough, the labor share is high
and the interest rate is low, that is, r < 1 in a laissez-faire equilibrium. Thus, even though an old agent’s labor
productivity is low, an old agent works in a laissez-faire equilibrium. As τ increases, savings by a young agent
and the labor supply of an old agent decrease. Then, how capital per unit of effective labor changes is generally
ambiguous, although as shown in Proposition 3, capital per unit of effective labor is constant as long as an old
agent supplies a positive amount of labor. After τ reaches the level at which an old agent fully retires, capital
per unit of effective labor starts decreasing in τ . Since at τ˜ f , welfare is maximized conditional on an old agent
fully retiring, k f (τ˜ f ) = k∗. Thus, when τ = τ˜ f , k = k∗ and lo = l∗ are achieved, and hence, τ˜ f is the second-best
payroll tax rate.
Recall again that when θ > θ̂ , an old agent partially retires in the first-best allocation, that is, lo∗ < 1. When
α is high, that is, α ≥ α , the labor share is low and the interest rate in a laissez-faire equilibrium is high. Thus,
even though an old agent’s labor productivity is high, an old agent fully retires in a laissez-faire equilibrium.
11A laissez-faire equilibrium is an equilibrium with τ = 0.
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By the same argument as for Case 1(i), the second-best payroll tax rate is 0, and an old agent fully retires in
the second-best allocation. When α is intermediate, that is, α > α ≥ α̂ , capital is still under-accumulated in
a laissez-faire equilibrium, while an old agent works in the laissez-faire equilibrium. Since α is intermediate,
the labor share, 1−α , is not so high. Thus, in the laissez-faire equilibrium, an old agent works less than the
first-best level, that is, 1− lo < 1− lo∗. Because capital is under-accumulated, a low tax rate is better in terms
of capital accumulation. In addition, since an old agent works less than before as τ increases, a low tax rate
is also better in terms of labor. Therefore, τ = 0 is the second-best payroll tax rate. In addition, leisure in the
second-best allocation is not larger than the first-best level, that is, lo ≥ lo∗.12 When α is low, that is, α < α̂ ,
in a laissez-faire equilibrium, the capital per unit of effective labor satisfies f ′(k) < 1. In addition, since the
labor share is high and an old agent’s labor productivity is high, an old agent partially retires in a laissez-faire
equilibrium and 1− lo(0) > 1− l∗. The logic for this case is similar to that for Case 1(ii). As τ increases, lo
increases and k is constant until an old agent fully retires. Once an old agent fully retires, k starts decreasing as
τ increases. Different from Case 1(ii), the first-best labor supply by an old agent is positive, that is, 1− lo∗ > 0.
Thus, there is trade-off between capital accumulation and labor supply by an old agent. At τ˜ f , lo(τ˜ f ) = 1 and
k f (τ˜ f ) = k∗. In this case, capital is the golden rule, whereas an old agent supplies less labor than the first-best
level. At τ˜p, which is less than τ˜ f , lo(τ˜p) = lo∗ and kp(τ˜p) > k∗. In this case, the labor supply by an old agent
is first-best level, while capital is not the golden rule. Which tax rate, τ˜ f or τ˜p, is the second-best payroll tax
rate depends on which welfare loss is severer. If the welfare loss from the over-accumulation of capital is severer
than that from the over-supply of an old agent’s labor, then τ˜ f is the second-best payroll tax rate; otherwise, τ˜p
is the second-best payroll tax rate. Unfortunately, it is not easy to derive the conditions under which τ˜ f is the
second-best payroll tax rate and under which τ˜p is the second-best payroll tax rate. In the next section, I propose
sufficient conditions under which τ˜ f is the second-best payroll tax rate and under which τ˜p is the second-best
payroll tax rate.
When θ ≤ θ̂ and α < α˜ , the second-best allocation coincides with the first-best allocation. This finding is
different from the conclusion of Michel and Pestieau (2013). When θ > θ̂ , however, the second-best allocation
and the first-best allocation are different, as argued by Michel and Pestieau (2013). Michel and Pestieau (2013)
claim that to achieve the first-best allocation in the decentralized economy, the social planner needs to control
both the pay-as-you-go social security tax rate and retirement age. The finding in this paper implies that their
argument relies on the implicit assumption that labor productivity does not depreciate. As Proposition 6 shows,
12When an old agent partially retires in the laissez-faire equilibrium, lo = γ(α+θ)θ [β (1−α)+γ] . From this and l
o∗ in Proposition 5, lo ≥ lo∗ if
and only if α ≥ α̂ .
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if labor productivity sufficiently depreciates and the capital share in the production function is not too high,
then pay-as-you-go social security is enough to achieve the first-best allocation in the decentralized economy. In
addition, from the above arguments, if an old agent partially retires in the first-best allocation, then pay-as-you-go
social security only is not enough to implement the first-best allocation in the decentralized economy.
5 Discussion
5.1 The second-best payroll tax rate when θ > θ̂ and α < α̂
When θ > θ̂ and α < α̂ , as Proposition 6 shows, which payroll tax rate, τ˜ f or τ˜p, is the second-best tax rate is
ambiguous. In what follows, I give sufficient conditions under which τ˜ f is the second-best payroll tax rate and
under which τ˜p is the second-best payroll tax rate. First, I provide a sufficient condition under which τ˜ f is the
second-best payroll tax rate.
Proposition 7. Suppose that θ = θ̂ . If α , β , and γ satisfy
0< α <
(1+β )(β + γ)− γ
(1+β )(1+ γ)+β (2+2β + γ)
,
then W (τ˜ f )>W (τ˜p), that is, τ˜ f is the second-best payroll tax rate.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In this case, capital per unit of effective labor is the first-best level, while an old agent provides less labor
than the first-best level. This finding also differs from the finding in Michel and Pestieau (2013), who claim that
the second-best payroll tax rate is lower than the payroll tax rate that achieves the golden rule. Their argument
is true as long as an old agent partially retires in the decentralized economy. Once the corner solution, lo = 1,
is taken into account, however, the second-best payroll tax rate can coincide with the first-best payroll tax rate.
Note that in this case, an old agent supplies less labor than the first-best level.
The intuition is as follows. Let cyf and r f denote the consumption of a young agent under τ˜ f and the interest
rate rate under τ˜ f , respectively. Moreover, let lof denote the leisure of an old agent under τ˜ f . Then, welfare under
τ˜ f is
W (τ˜ f ) = ln(cyf )+β ln(β r f c
y)+ γ ln(lof )
= (1+β ) ln(cyf )+β ln(β ),
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where cof = β r f c
y
f , r f = 1 and l
o
f = 1 are used. By analogy, welfare under τ˜p is written as
W (τ˜p) = ln(cyp)+β ln(β rpc
y
p)+ γ ln(l
o
p)
= (1+β ) ln(cyp)+β ln(β )+β ln(rp)+ γ ln(l
o
p).
From these,
W (τ˜ f )−W (τ˜p) = (1+β ) ln
(
cyf
cyp
)
+β ln
(
1
rp
)
+ γ ln
(
1
lop
)
. (13)
Note that the first and second terms in Equation (13) are negative and the last term in Equation (13) is positive.
When θ is small, lop is close to 1 because an old agent will receive a small amount even though s/he works.
Therefore, the third term in Equation (13) is very close to zero. If α is small enough, capital per unit of effective
labor is over-accumulated in an economy. This implies that rp is much smaller than 1 and hence, the second term
in Equation (13) becomes large, and in total, W (τ˜ f )−W (τ˜p) becomes positive. If the conditions in Proposition
7 hold, the above argument is true. Although θ is equal to θ̂ in Proposition 7, because of the continuity ofW in
θ , as long as θ is larger than θ̂ but sufficiently close to θ̂ , τ˜ f is optimal if α is sufficiently small. This argument,
however, may not hold if θ is large enough.
Proposition 8. Suppose that β + γ > 1 and β = γ . In addition, suppose θ = 1. Then, even though α is small
enough, W (τ˜p)>W (τ˜ f ), that is, τ˜p is the second-best payroll tax rate.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As α increases, the gap between the interest rate and the population growth rate in the laissez-faire equilib-
rium shrinks. Therefore, it is reasonable to conjecture that if θ = 1, for any α ∈ (0,1), τ˜p is optimal. Note that
this proposition corresponds to the welfare analysis in Michel and Pestieau (2013).
Under the condition in Proposition 8, since θ is large enough, from the social planner’s point of view, the
gain from more labor supplied by productive old agents dominates the loss from the over-accumulated capital
per unit of effective labor. Although in Proposition 8, θ is set at 1, the statement could hold if θ is smaller than
1 but sufficiently close to 1 because of the continuity of W in θ .
To fix the idea, I provide a numerical example. Set β = γ = 1. In this case, θ̂ = γ1+β = 0.333. Since
Propositions 7 and 8 consider extreme cases of θ , consider a medium value of θ and set θ = 0.7.13 Then,
13This number is chosen arbitrarily.
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α̂ = 0.2766, α˜ = 0.3953, and α = 0.4118. Consider two values of α , α = 0.2 and α = 0.1. When α = 0.2,
the optimal tax rate is τ˜p = 0.0556 and W (τ˜p) = −2.6282. For reference, τ˜ f = 0.2500 and W (τ˜ f ) = −2.6373.
Figure 1 shows how W changes in τ in this case. When α = 0.1, the optimal tax rate is τ˜ f = 0.3889 and
W (τ˜ f ) = −2.1087. For reference, τ˜p = 0.1139 and W (τ˜p) = −2.2037. Figure 2 shows this case. As these
numerical examples show, if α is high in (0, α̂), τ˜p is optimal, while if α is low, then τ˜ f is optimal. In addition,
note that W is not a unimodal function. This suggests that a first-order condition is not necessarily sufficient to
specify the globally optimal tax rate.
5.2 Application to the real economy
Determining whether or not the real economy is at the (second-best) optimum is an important and interesting
question. If the criterion for the judgment is simple and easy to use, it is good for society.14
Proposition 6 provides a simple criterion by which to determine the optimal payroll tax rate. For example,
consider the U.S. economy. Suppose that a young agent starts working at age 20 and becomes eligible to receive
social security at age 65. Then, one period in this paper corresponds to 45 years. Following Kitao (2014),
since a subjective discount factor is 0.98, β is set to (0.9815)45 = 0.4316. The weight on leisure relative to
consumption is 0.5123 in Kitao (2014), and so γ = β ∗0.5123= 0.2211. The capital share, α , is set at 0.4. Under
these parameter values, θ̂ = 0.1544 and α˜ = 0.2316. Hence, if an old agent’s labor productivity depreciates
sufficiently, that is, θ ≤ 0.1544, since α˜ < α = 0.4, the second-best payroll tax rate is 0, and an old agent fully
retires. Consider the case in which θ > θ̂ = 0.1544. Since α̂ is strictly decreasing in θ , α̂ ≤ β+γ−θ̂
1+γ+β (2+θ̂)
= 0.2316.
Thus, for all θ ≥ θ̂ , α = 0.4 > 0.2316 ≥ α̂; by Proposition 6, the second-best payroll tax rate is 0, and an old
agent partially retires. Although the model is too simple to describe the real economy, the model suggests that
for any θ ∈ (0,1], the second-best payroll tax rate is 0. This result coincides with the result in Abel et al. (1989).
However, depending on the size of θ , an old agent’s working behavior at the second-best payroll tax rate will be
different. If θ is low enough, then an old agent should retire fully at the second-best payroll tax rate, while if θ
is large enough, then an old agent should work for some time and retire later at the second-best payroll tax rate
14Abel et al. (1989) consider a standard Diamond-type overlapping-generations model and estimate the rate of return from saving,
r, using U.S. data. They conclude that the U.S. economy is dynamically efficient. For a stochastic overlapping-generations model, see
Chattopadhyay (2006) and Barbie et al. (2007).
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6 Conclusions
This paper studies a Diamond-type overlapping-generations model with pay-as-you-go social security and an old
agent’s retirement decision making. The paper characterizes a perfect foresight competitive equilibrium, the first-
best allocation, and the second-best allocation. Moreover, the relationship between the first-best allocation and
the second-best allocation is discussed. In contrast to the finding in Michel and Pestieau (2013), the paper shows
the possibility that using pay-as-you-go social security alone can lead the economy to the first-best optimum.
The key parameters for deriving the results in this paper are capital share in the production function and an
old agent’s labor productivity relative to a young agent’s labor productivity. If an old agent’s labor productivity is
not too low, then correcting the over-accumulation of capital can lower welfare. However, if an old agent’s labor
productivity is low, then inducing an old agent to retire early increases welfare. Recently, in many developed
countries, people have been living longer than before and old people’s productivity is also higher than before. In
such a case, instead of providing generous social security benefits and having old people retire early, providing
less generous social security benefits and making them work longer can improve welfare and can also solve the
sustainability problem of the social security system.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Consider an agent’s problem. Let
L = ln(cyt )+β ln(cot+1)+ γ ln(l
o
t+1)+λ
{
(1− τ)wt +
(1− τ)(1− lot+1)θwt+1+ lot+1Pt+1
rt+1
− cyt −
cot+1
rt+1
}
+η(1− lot+1)
be the Lagrangian of an agent’s problem. Taking the derivative of L with respect to cyt , cot+1 andlot+1,
cot+1 = β rt+1c
y
t (14)
and
γ
lot+1
≥ (1− τ)θwt+1−Pt+1
rt+1c
y
t
(15)
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with equality holding if lot+1 < 1.
Consider the case in which lot+1 = 1 in equilibrium. This implies that Equation (15) is
γ ≥ (1− τ)θwt+1−Pt+1
rt+1c
y
t
. (16)
In this case, from the agent’s lifetime budget constraint,
cyt =
1
1+β
[
(1− τ)wt + Pt+1rt+1
]
.
Thus,
st = (1− τ)wt − cyt =
β (1− τ)
1+β
wt − 11+β
Pt+1
rt+1
.
Since kt+1 = Kt+1Lt+1 = st in this case,
kt+1 =
β (1− τ)
1+β
wt − 11+β
Pt+1
rt+1
=
β (1− τ)
1+β
(1−α)kαt −
1
1+β
τwt+1
rt+1
=
β (1− τ)
1+β
(1−α)kαt −
τ
1+β
1−α
α
kt+1,
where wt = (1−α)kαt , rt = αk1−αt , and Pt+1 = τwt+1 are used. From this equation, the law of motion of capital
per unit of effective labor is
kt+1 =
αβ (1− τ)(1−α)
(1+β )α+ τ(1−α)k
α
t . (17)
Equation (16) can be rewritten as
γrt+1
1+β
[
(1− τ)wt + τwt+1rt+1
]
≥ (1− τ)θwt+1− τwt+1.
Rearranging this equation, I have
γ(1− τ)(1−α)
1+β
kαt ≥
[
(1− τ)θ − τ− γτ
1+β
]
1−α
α
kt+1. (18)
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If the RHS of Equation (18) is less than or equal to zero, that is,
τ ≥ θ(1+β )
(1+θ)(1+β )+ γ
,
then Equation (18) automatically holds. Hence, lot+1 = 1.
Suppose 0≤ τ < θ(1+β )(1+θ)(1+β )+γ . Then, from Equation (18), if kt and kt+1 satisfy
kt+1 ≤ αγ(1− τ){(1− τ)θ − τ}(1+β )− γτ k
α
t ,
then lot+1 = 1. Since the law of motion of capital per unit of effective labor is specified by Equation (17), if
αβ (1− τ)(1−α)
(1+β )α+ τ(1−α) ≤
αγ(1− τ)
{(1− τ)θ − τ}(1+β )− γτ ,
then lot+1 = 1. This equation can be rewritten as
τ ≥ β (1−α)θ − γα
(1−α)[β (1+θ)+ γ] .
Note that for all γ > 0,
θ(1+β )
(1+θ)(1+β )+ γ
> τ̂ =
β (1−α)θ − γα
(1−α)[β (1+θ)+ γ] .
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Suppose lot+1 < 1. Then, from Equation (15),
[(1− τ)θwt+1−Pt+1] lot+1 = γrt+1cyt .
Plugging this and Equation (14) into the agent’s lifetime budget constraint,
cyt =
1
1+β + γ
[
(1− τ)wt + (1− τ)θwt+1rt+1
]
.
15The inequality holds if θ(1+β )(1−α)β (1+θ)+θ(1+β )γ > β (1−α)θ(1+θ)(1+β )+β (1−α)θγ−γα[(1+θ)(1+β )+γ].
Since the first terms on both sides are the same and θγ(1+β )> θγβ (1−α), the LHS is greater than the RHS.
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From this,
st = (1− τ)wt − cyt =
(β + γ)(1− τ)
1+β + γ
wt − (1− τ)θ1+β + γ
wt+1
rt+1
.
Now consider an agent’s choice of lot+1. From Equation (15),
lot+1 =
γrt+1cyt
(1− τ)θwt+1−Pt+1 .
Since in equilibrium, lot+1Pt+1 = τwt+1[1+θ(1− lot+1)] holds,
lot+1 =
γrt+1cyt
(1− τ)θwt+1− τwt+1[1+θ(1−l
o
t+1)]
lot+1
.
From this,
θwt+1lot+1 = γrt+1c
y
t + τwt+1(1+θ)
holds. By using kt and kt+1, lot+1 in equilibrium is written as
lot+1 =
γα(1− τ)
θ(1+β + γ)
kαt
kt+1
+
γ(1− τ)
1+β + γ
+
τ(1+θ)
θ
. (19)
Since kt+1 = st1+θ(1−lot+1) ,
kt+1 =
(β+γ)(1−τ)
1+β+γ (1−α)kαt − 11+β+γ (1−τ)θ(1−α)α kt+1
1+θ
[
1− γα(1−τ)θ(1+β+γ) k
α
t
kt+1
− γ(1−τ)1+β+γ − τ(1+θ)θ
]
=
(β+γ)(1−α)
1+β+γ k
α
t − θ1+β+γ 1−αα kt+1
1+θ − γα1+β+γ k
α
t
kt+1
− θγ1+β+γ
.
From this equation, the law of motion of capital per unit of effective labor is
kt+1 =
α[β (1−α)+ γ]
α(1+β + γ)+θ(1+αβ )
kαt .
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Plugging this into Equation (19), I have
lot+1 =
γ(1− τ)(α+θ)+ τ(1+θ)[β (1−α)+ γ]
θ [β (1−α)+ γ] .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Taking the derivative of lot+1 with respect to τ , I obtain
∂ lot+1
∂τ
=
−γ(α+θ)+(1+θ)[β (1−α)+ γ]
θ [β (1−α)+ γ] =
γ(1−α)+β (1+θ)(1−α)
θ [β (1−α)+ γ] > 0. (20)
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Let
L = ln(cy)+β ln(co)+ γ ln(lo)+λ {[1+θ(1− lo)][ f (k)− k]− cy− co}+η(1− lot+1)
be the Lagrangian of the problem. Taking the derivative of L with respect to cy, co, andlo,
co = βcy, (21)
f ′(k)−1= 0, (22)
and
γ
lo
≥ 1
cy
θ [ f (k)− k] (23)
with equality holding if lo < 1. From Equation (22),
k∗ = α
1
1−α .
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Suppose lo∗ = 1. Then, from the resource constraint, cy+ co = f (k∗)− k∗ holds. Since co = βcy,
cy∗ =
1−α
1+β
α
α
1−α .
Since these must satisfy Equation (23),
θ ≤ θ̂ .
Suppose lo∗ < 1. In this case, cy = θ lo∗γ [ f (k
∗)− k∗] holds. From the resource constraint, I obtain
cy∗ =
(1−α)(1+θ)
1+β + γ
α
α
1−α .
By using this, I have
lo∗ =
(1+θ)γ
θ(1+β + γ)
,
which is less than 1 when θ > θ̂ .
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6
In the proof, first, I characterize the second-best allocation conditional on an old agent fully retiring, and next, I
characterize the second-best allocation conditional on an old agent partially retiring. After that, combining the
findings from these two cases, the proof is completed.
A.5.1 The second-best allocation when an old agent fully retires
Suppose that given τ ∈ [0,1), an old agent fully retires. Then, from Proposition 1, in the steady state,
cy = (1− τ)w− s= (1− τ)(1−α)kαf − k f ,
co = rs+P= αkαf + τ(1−α)kαf ,
and
lo = 1.
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Taking the derivative of W with respect to τ , I obtain
∂W
∂τ
(τ) =
1
cy
[
∂cy
∂τ
+
1
r
∂co
∂τ
]
.
In the brackets,
∂cy
∂τ
+
1
r
∂co
∂τ
= (1− τ)(1−α)αkα−1f
∂k f
∂τ
− (1−α)kαf −
∂k f
∂τ
+
1
αkα−1f
[
α2kα−1f
∂k f
∂τ
+(1−α)kαf + τ(1−α)αkα−1f
∂k f
∂τ
]
= (αkα−1f −1)
[
∂k f
∂τ
(1− τ)− k
α
]
(1−α).
From Corollary 1, ∂k f∂τ < 0. Since τ ∈ [0,1), cy > 0 and α ∈ (0,1),
∂k f
∂τ (1− τ)− kα < 0. Hence, ∂W∂τ (τ) > 0 if
and only if αkα−1f (τ)−1< 0.
From Equation (9), k f is strictly decreasing in τ . Therefore, if αkα−1f (0) ≥ 1 holds, αkα−1f (τ) ≥ 1 for all
τ ∈ [0,1). In this case, ∂W∂τ ≤ 0 for all τ ∈ [0,1). When τ = 0,
k f (0) =
[
αβ (1−α)
α(1+β )
] 1
1−α
.
Then, α(k f (0))α−1 ≥ 1 if and only if α ≥ α˜ := β1+2β .
Lemma 1. Suppose α > α˜ and an old agent fully retires. Then, ∂W∂τ < 0 for all τ ∈ [0,1). In addition, if α = α˜ ,
then ∂W∂τ (0) = 0 and
∂W
∂τ < 0 for all τ ∈ (0,1). Suppose α < α˜ and an old agent fully retires. Then, there is a
unique τ˜ f ∈ (0,1) that maximizes W (τ), where
τ˜ f =
β −α(1+2β )
(1−α)(1+β ) .
Proof. Note that the sign of ∂W∂τ is determined by α(k f (τ))
α−1 − 1. If α(k f (τ))α−1 < 1, ∂W∂τ > 0, and if
α(k f (τ))α−1 > 1, ∂W∂τ < 0. Note further that α(k f (τ))
α−1 is strictly increasing and continuous in τ . If α < α˜ ,
then α(k f (0))α−1 < 1. As τ approaches 1, αkα−1f →+∞. Hence, there is a unique τ˜ f ∈ (0,1) such that
∂W
∂τ
(τ)

>
=
<
0 if τ

<
=
>
 τ˜ f .
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Moreover, since τ˜ f must satisfy α(k f (τ˜ f ))α−1−1= 0,
τ˜ f :=
β −α(1+2β )
(1−α)(1+β ) .
Note that when α = α˜ f , τ˜ f = 0. Since the numerator of τ˜ f is decreasing in α , for all α ≤ α˜ f , τ˜ f ≥ 0. Note
also that τ˜ f is strictly decreasing in α .16 As α → 0, τ˜ f → β1+β < 1. Since τ˜ f is continuous in α , τ˜ f < 1 for all
α ≤ α˜ f .
It is known that if τ < τ̂ , an old agent does not fully retire in equilibrium. Thus, it is useful to know when
τ˜ f ≥ τ̂ holds.
Lemma 2. τ˜ f ≥ τ̂ if and only if
α ≤ α̂ := β + γ−θ
1+ γ+β (2+θ)
,
with equality holding if α = α̂ .
Proof. τ˜ f ≥ τ̂ if and only if
β [β (1+θ)+ γ]−α(1+2β )[β (1+θ)+ γ]≥ β (1−α)θ(1+β )− γα(1+β ).
Rearranging this equation, I obtain
β + γ−θ ≥ α[1+2β + γ+βθ ].
From this, α̂ is derived.
Note that α̂ > 0 if and only if θ < β + γ . τ˜ f is well-defined when α ≤ α˜ by Lemma 1. Thus, the sizes of α̂
and α˜ are necessary information in the discussion of the second-best payroll tax rate.
Lemma 3. α̂ ≥ α˜ if and only if
θ ≤ θ̂ := γ
1+β
,
with equality holding if θ = θ̂ .
16Taking the derivative of α˜ f with respect to α , I obtain − 1+2β(1−α)(1+β ) +
[β−α(1+2β )](1+β )
(1−α)2(1+β )2 . Rearranging this, the sign is determined
by −(1+2β )(1−α)+ [β −α(1+2β )] =−1−β < 0.
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Proof. α̂ > α˜ f if and only if
(β + γ−θ)(1+2β )> β [1+ γ+β (2+θ)].
Rearranging this equation with respect to θ , I obtain
γ(1+β )> θ(1+β )2.
From this, θ̂ is derived.
Recall that if α > α = βθβθ+γ , then an old agent will retire fully in equilibrium for all τ ∈ [0,1).
Lemma 4. α ≤ α˜ if and only if θ ≤ θ̂ , with equality holding if θ = θ̂ .
Proof.
βθ
βθ + γ
<
β
1+2β
⇔ θ
βθ + γ
<
1
1+2β
⇔ θ(1+2β )< βθ + γ
⇔ θ < γ
1+β
.
A.5.2 The second-best allocation when an old agent partially retires
From Proposition 3, when an old agent partially retires, in the steady state,
cy = (1− τ)(1−α)kαp − s,
s = kp[1+θ(1− lo)],
co = αkα−1p s+(1− τ)(1− lo)θ(1−α)kαp + loP,
lo =
γ(1− τ)(α+θ)+ τ(1+θ)[β (1−α)+ γ]
θ [β (1−α)+ γ] ,
and
loP= τ(1−α)kαp [1+θ(1− lo)].
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From these equations,
cy = (1− τ)(1−α)kαp − kp[1+θ(1− lo)],
co = αkαp +θ(1− lo)kαp + τ(1−α)kαp .
Taking the derivative of W with respect to τ , I have
∂W
∂τ
=
1
cy
{
−(1−α)kαp +(1− τ)(1−α)αkα−1p
∂kp
∂τ
− [1+θ(1− lo)]∂kp
∂τ
+ kpθ
∂ lo
∂τ
}
+
β
co
 α
2kα−1p
∂kp
∂τ +θ(1− lo)αkα−1p
∂kp
∂τ −θkαp ∂ l
o
∂τ
+(1−α)kαp + τ(1−α)αkα−1p ∂kp∂τ
+ γlo ∂ l
o
∂τ
.
Since ∂kp∂τ = 0 in the steady state,
∂W
∂τ
=
1
cy
{
−(1−α)kαp + kpθ
∂ lo
∂τ
}
+
β
co
{
−θkαp
∂ lo
∂τ
+(1−α)kαp
}
+
γ
lo
∂ lo
∂τ
=
1
cy
(1−α)kαp
[
−1+ 1
r
]
+
∂ lo
∂τ
[
kpθ
cy
α−1
α
+
γ
lo
]
, (24)
where I use the equilibrium condition co = β rcy. Since γlo =
(1−τ)θ(1−α)kαp−P
rcy ,
∂W
∂τ
=
1
cy
{
(1−α)kαp
[
−1+ 1
r
]
− ∂ l
o
∂τ
θ
1−α
α
kp+
∂ lo
∂τ
(1− τ)θ(1−α)kαp −P
r
}
(25)
=
1
cy
{
(1−α)kαp
[
−1+ 1
r
]
− ∂ l
o
∂τ
θ
1−α
α
τkp− ∂ l
o
∂τ
P
r
}
.
Since cy > 0, the sign of ∂W∂τ is equivalent to
(1−α)kαp
[
−1+ 1
r
]
− ∂ l
o
∂τ
θ
1−α
α
τkp− ∂ l
o
∂τ
P
r
= (1−α)kαp
[
−1+ 1
r
]
− ∂ l
o
∂τ
1−α
α
τkp
1+θ
lo
= (1−α)kαp
[
−1+ 1
r
− ∂ l
o
∂τ
1
α
τk1−αp
1+θ
lo
]
, (26)
where P= τw[1+θ(1−l
o)]
lo and
P
r = τ
1−α
α kp
1+θ(1−lo)
lo are used.
Replacing kp, lo, and ∂ l
o
∂τ with Equation (12), Equation (10) and Equation (20) respectively, Equation (26)
can be rewritten as
(1−α)kαp
[
−1+ β (1−α)+ γ
α(1+β + γ)+θ(1+αβ )
γ(1− τ)(α+θ)+ τ(1+θ)[αγ−βθ(1−α)]
γ(1− τ)(α+θ)+ τ(1+θ)[β (1−α)+ γ]
]
.
26
Hence, ∂W∂τ > 0 if and only if
−1+ β (1−α)+ γ
α(1+β + γ)+θ(1+αβ )
γ(1− τ)(α+θ)+ τ(1+θ)[αγ−βθ(1−α)]
γ(1− τ)(α+θ)+ τ(1+θ)[β (1−α)+ γ] > 0. (27)
Proposition 9. Suppose that an old agent partially retires. If α ≥ max{0, α̂}, then ∂W∂τ ≤ 0 for all τ ∈ [0,1).
Assume further that θ < β + γ . If α < α̂ , then
τ˜p :=
γ{β + γ−θ −α[1+ γ+β (2+θ)]}
(1−α)[β (1+θ)+ γ](1+β + γ) ∈ (0,1) (28)
such that ∂W∂τ > 0 for τ ∈ [0, τ˜p), ∂W∂τ = 0 for τ = τ˜p, and ∂W∂τ < 0 for τ > τ˜p.
Proof. Equation (27) is equivalent to
[β (1−α)+ γ]{γ(1− τ)(α+θ)+ τ(1+θ)[αγ−βθ(1−α)]}
> [α(1+β + γ)+θ(1+αβ )]{γ(1− τ)(α+θ)+ τ(1+θ)[β (1−α)+ γ]} .
Rearranging this equation, I obtain
τ < τ˜p :=
γ{β + γ−θ −α[1+ γ+β (2+θ)]}
(1−α)[β (1+θ)+ γ](1+β + γ) .
When α ≥ max{0, α̂}, the numerator of τ˜p is smaller than 0 with equality holding if α = α̂ > 0. Therefore,
∂W
∂τ < 0 for all τ .
Assuming θ < β+γ , α̂ > 0. When α < α̂ , then for τ < τ˜p, ∂W∂τ > 0, for τ = τ˜p,
∂V
∂τ = 0, and for τ > τ̂p,
∂W
∂τ <
0. Therefore, τ = τ˜p maximizes welfare. When α < α̂ , because β + γ−θ −α[1+ γ+β +(2+θ)]> 0, τ˜p > 0.
τ˜p < 1 if and only if γ[β + γ−θ ]− γα[1+ γ+β (2+θ)]< (1−α)(1+β + γ)β (1+θ)+(1−α)(1+β + γ)γ .
Rearranging this, I have 0< (1−α)(1+β + γ)β (1+θ)+ γ(1+θ)+ γα(β +θ), which is always true.
From the equilibrium analysis, τ˜p induces a partial-retirement equilibrium if and only if τ˜p < τ̂ .
Lemma 5. τ˜p ≤ τ̂ if and only if θ ≥ θ̂ , with equality holding if θ = θ̂ .
Proof. τ˜p < τ̂ if and only if
γ{β + γ−θ −α[1+ γ+β (2+θ)]}
1+β + γ
< β (1−α)θ − γα.
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Rearranging this equation, I obtain
αβ [θ(1+β )− γ]< (β + γ)[θ(1+β )− γ]. (29)
Hence, if θ > θ̂ , θ(1+β )− γ > 0, and Equation (29) is equivalent to
α <
β + γ
β
.
Since α ∈ (0,1), this inequality always holds. If θ < θ̂ , θ(1+β )− γ < 0. Then, Equation (29) is equivalent to
α >
β + γ
β
,
which does not hold at all because α ∈ (0,1). When θ = θ̂ , τ˜p = τ̂ .
A.5.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. When θ ≤ θ̂ , by Lemmas 3 and 4, α < α˜ < α̂ holds. If α ≥ α̂ > α , for any τ ∈ [0,1), an old agent fully
retires in equilibrium. Moreover, if α > α˜ , a lower tax results in higher welfare. Hence, the optimal payroll tax
rate is 0.
Suppose that α ≥ α˜ and α < α̂ . Since α > α , an old agent fully retires in equilibrium for all τ ∈ [0,1).
Since α ≥ α˜ , a lower tax rate is better. Therefore, the optimal tax rate is 0.
Suppose that α ≥ α and α < α˜ . Similar to the above cases, an old agent fully retires in equilibrium for all
τ ∈ [0,1). Since α < α˜ , by Lemma 3, τ˜ f ∈ (0,1) is optimal.
Finally, suppose that α < α . Since α < α˜ , τ˜ f gives the highest welfare when an old agent fully retires,
whereas τ̂ maximizes welfare when an old agent partially retires. Since under τ = τ̂ , an old agent fully retires,
W (τ˜ f )>W (τ̂) holds. Hence, τ˜ f is optimal.
When θ > θ̂ , α̂ ≤ α˜ ≤ α holds. If α ≥ α , an old agent fully retires in equilibrium for all τ ∈ [0,1). Since
α ≥ α˜ , a lower tax rate is better. Therefore, τ = 0 is optimal, and an old agent fully retires.
If α ≥ α˜ and α < α , τ = τ̂ > 0. In this case, since α ≥ α˜ , if an old agent fully retires, τ = τ̂ gives the
highest welfare. If an old agent partially retires, from Proposition 9, τ = 0 gives the highest welfare. Note that
from Proposition 9, W (τ) is strictly decreasing in τ ∈ (0, τ̂) and W (0) >W (τ) for all τ ∈ (0, τ̂). Since W is
continuous in τ ,17 W (0)>W (τ̂). Therefore, the optimal tax rate is 0, and an old agent partially retires.
17Note that k is continuous in τ , all variables are determined by k, and W is continuous in k. Therefore, W is continuous in τ .
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If α ≥ α̂ and α < α˜ , then, by Lemmas 1 and 2, τ̂ gives the highest welfare if an old agent fully retires in
equilibrium. From Proposition 9, τ = 0 gives the highest welfare if an old agent partially retires in equilibrium.
The same reason in the previous case is applicable to this case. Thus, the optimal tax rate is τ = 0, and an old
agent partially retires.
If α < α̂ , by Lemmas 1 and 2, τ˜ gives the highest welfare if an old agent fully retires in equilibrium. If an
old agent partially retires in equilibrium, then, by Proposition 9, τ˜p maximizes welfare. However, because of the
complexity of the calculation, it is not possible to determine which tax rate is optimal.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. When θ = θ̂ , Lemma 5 implies that τ˜p = τ̂ . From Lemma 2, if α < β+γ−θ̂1+γ+β (2+θ̂) , then τ˜ f > τ̂ . The
equation α < β+γ−θ̂
1+γ+β (2+θ̂)
is equivalent to
α <
(1+β )(β + γ)− γ
(1+β )(1+ γ)+β (2+2β + γ)
.
Hence, W (τ˜ f )>W (τ̂) =W (τ˜p).
A.7 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Since cyf = (1− τ˜ f )(1−α)(k f (τ˜ f ))α − k f (τ˜ f ),
cyf = k f (τ˜)
1−α
α(1+β )
.
By analogy, since cyp = (1− τ˜p)(1−α)(kp(τ˜p))α − kp(τ˜p)[1+θ(1− lop)],
cyp = kp(τ˜p)
(1− τ˜p)(1−α)(α+θ)
α[β (1−α)+ γ] .
From these,
cyf
cyp
=
k f (τ˜ f )
kp(τ˜p)
β (1−α)+ γ
(1+β )(α+θ)(1− τ˜p) .
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Using the expressions of k f and kp (Equations (9) and (12)), I obtain
cyf
cyp
=
[
α(1+β + γ)+θ(1+αβ )
β (1−α)+ γ
] 1
1−α β (1−α)+ γ
(1+β )(α+θ)
× (1−α)(1+β + γ)[β (1+θ)+ γ]
(1+β + γ)(1−α)β (1+θ)+ γ[1+αβ +θ(1+α)] . (30)
When θ = 1 and β = γ , Equation (30) becomes
[
α(1+2β )+1+αβ
β (1−α)+β
] 1
1−α β (1−α)+β
(1+β )(α+1)
(1−α)(1+2β )3β
(1+2β )(1−α)2β +β [2+αβ +α] .
Thus,
lim
α→0
cyf
cyp
=
3β (1+2β )
4β (1+β )2
.
Since rp = α(1+β+γ)+θ(1+αβ )β (1−α)+γ , when β = γ and θ = 1,
rp =
α(1+2β )+1+αβ
β (1−α)+β .
Thus,
lim
α→0
rp =
1
2β
.
From Equations (10) and (28), when β = γ and θ = 1,
lim
α→0
lop =
2β
1+2β
.
Hence,
lim
α→0
[W (τ˜ f )−W (τ˜p)] = ln
(
31+β (1+2β )1+2β
22+2β (1+β )2+2β
)
.
If 3
1+β (1+2β )1+2β
22+2β (1+β )2+2β < 1, limα→0[W (τ˜ f )−W (τ˜p)]< 0.
Let
h(β ) :=
31+β (1+2β )1+2β
22+2β (1+β )2+2β
=
(
1+2β
1+β
)1+2β (3
4
)1+β 1
1+β
.
Taking the derivative of h with respect to β , I obtain
dh
dβ
=
(
1+2β
1+β
)2β (3
4
)1+β 1
(1+β )2
[
2
{
ln
(
1+2β
1+β
)
+
β
(1+2β )(1+β )
}
(1+2β )+(1+2β ) ln
(
3
4
)
− 2β
1+β
]
.
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The fourth term of dhdβ is
2(1+2β ) ln
(
1+2β
1+β
)
+(1+2β ) ln
(
3
4
)
= (1+2β ) ln
(
1+4β +4β 2
1+2β +β 2
· 3
4
)
.
Note that β + γ > 1 and β = γ imply that β > 12 . For β ∈ (1/2,1], 3(1+4β +4β 2)> 4(1+2β +β 2) because
8β 2+4β −1= 8(β + 14)2− 32 , which is increasing in β on (1/2,1], and at β = 1/2, the value is 3. Therefore,
since
ln
(
1+4β +4β 2
1+2β +β 2
· 3
4
)
> 0,
h(β ) is strictly increasing in β on (1/2,1]. Since
h(1) =
(
3
2
)3(3
4
)2 1
2
=
243
256
< 1
even for a sufficiently small α , W (τ˜p)>W (τ˜ f ) holds.
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Figure 1: W (τ) when α = 0.2
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Figure 2: W (τ) when α = 0.1
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